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Abstract
Background: Text-based patient medical records are a vital resource in medical research. In
order to preserve patient confidentiality, however, the U.S. Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) requires that protected health information (PHI) be removed from
medical records before they can be disseminated. Manual de-identification of large medical record
databases is prohibitively expensive, time-consuming and prone to error, necessitating automatic
methods for large-scale, automated de-identification.
Methods:  We describe an automated Perl-based de-identification software package that is
generally usable on most free-text medical records, e.g., nursing notes, discharge summaries, X-ray
reports, etc. The software uses lexical look-up tables, regular expressions, and simple heuristics to
locate both HIPAA PHI, and an extended PHI set that includes doctors' names and years of dates.
To develop the de-identification approach, we assembled a gold standard corpus of re-identified
nursing notes with real PHI replaced by realistic surrogate information. This corpus consists of
2,434 nursing notes containing 334,000 words and a total of 1,779 instances of PHI taken from 163
randomly selected patient records. This gold standard corpus was used to refine the algorithm and
measure its sensitivity. To test the algorithm on data not used in its development, we constructed
a second test corpus of 1,836 nursing notes containing 296,400 words. The algorithm's false
negative rate was evaluated using this test corpus.
Results: Performance evaluation of the de-identification software on the development corpus
yielded an overall recall of 0.967, precision value of 0.749, and fallout value of approximately 0.002.
On the test corpus, a total of 90 instances of false negatives were found, or 27 per 100,000 word
count, with an estimated recall of 0.943. Only one full date and one age over 89 were missed. No
patient names were missed in either corpus.
Conclusion: We have developed a pattern-matching de-identification system based on dictionary
look-ups, regular expressions, and heuristics. Evaluation based on two different sets of nursing
notes collected from a U.S. hospital suggests that, in terms of recall, the software out-performs a
single human de-identifier (0.81) and performs at least as well as a consensus of two human de-
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identifiers (0.94). The system is currently tuned to de-identify PHI in nursing notes and discharge
summaries but is sufficiently generalized and can be customized to handle text files of any format.
Although the accuracy of the algorithm is high, it is probably insufficient to be used to publicly
disseminate medical data. The open-source de-identification software and the gold standard re-
identified corpus of medical records have therefore been made available to researchers via the
PhysioNet website to encourage improvements in the algorithm.
Background
Introduction
A wide range of medical research – from epidemiology to
the design of decision support systems – relies on medical
records [1]. For both legal and ethical reasons, it is neces-
sary to preserve patient confidentiality. In the United
States the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) [2] specifies 18 specific categories of infor-
mation that must be removed from medical records to be
used in research. These categories of protected health
information (PHI) include names, geographic locations
(more precise than a state), elements of dates except years,
social security numbers, telephone and fax numbers and
medical record numbers, among others. See Table 1 for a
complete list of HIPAA-specified PHI categories.
The process of de-identification generally involves scan-
ning the corpus of medical records line by line to identify
all occurrences of PHI. This identification of PHI could be
conducted manually by clinicians or persons familiar with
medical terms, by automated de-identification software,
or by a combination of software and expert oversight. In
prior studies, we have demonstrated that manual de-iden-
tification by medical professionals is prohibitively time-
consuming, expensive [3], and unreliable [4]. (We found
that resident clinicians could de-identify at a rate of about
18,000 words, or 90 incidents of PHI, per hour.) De-iden-
tification performance tends to be highly variable and
error prone [4]. Large-scale accurate de-identification
therefore requires automated software that is fine-tuned
to the structure of the text, the content of the medical
records, and the specific requirements of a particular
project.
Fortunately, automated de-identification can be not only
more reliable, but also more efficient and far less expen-
sive than manual de-identification.
Table 1: PHI types defined by HIPAA
PHI Type Notes
Names Both full and partial, but not initials
Locations All geographic subdivisions smaller than a state, including street 
address, city, county, precinct, zip code, and their equivalent 
geocodes
Dates All elements of dates (except years) for dates directly related to 
an individual, including birth date, admission date, discharge 
date, date of death
Ages > 89 years All elements of dates (including year) indicative of an age over 89 
years. Such ages and elements may be aggregated into a single 






Health plan beneficiary numbers
Account numbers
Certificate/license numbers
Vehicle identifiers Includes vehicle serial numbers and license plate numbers
Device identifiers and serial numbers Not restricted to medical devices
Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs)
Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers
Biometric identifiers Includes finger and voice prints
Any other unique identifying number, code, or characteristic E.g., full face photographic images of full faces, scars or tattoos 
(and any comparable images).BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2008, 8:32 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/8/32
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In this article a body of work is presented that addresses
the de-identification of free text medical records in the
MIMIC II database [1], a large annotated database of car-
diovascular and related signals and accompanying clinical
data from intensive care units (ICUs) in the United States.
All free text elements in this database have been scrubbed
for PHI. In order to further reduce the chance of identify-
ing a particular individual, we have also attempted to
remove any information that may aid in the identification
of attending clinical staff. Furthermore, instances of year-
only dates were also classified as PHI, since all data in the
MIMIC II database requires date-shifting, and the altered
date must be consistent with all date types in the text.
Previous work in the field of de-identification has focused
largely on highly-structured type-specific records [5-7,11-
20]. MIMIC II medical records, however, include free-text
notes with a highly variable structure and method of
reporting, which cannot be de-identified by methods
dependent upon a consistent and known structure. We
have developed an automated de-identification algorithm
that is suitable for a wide range of medical free text. Our
de-identification efforts in this study centered on develop-
ing a specific tool to scrub free-text nursing notes and dis-
charge summaries, and standardizing the evaluation of
de-identification software. The gold standard re-identified
corpus of medical records is available on request from the
PhysioNet website [8,9], together with the de-identifica-
tion algorithm under an open source license.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) guidelines
In the United States, guidelines for protecting the confi-
dentiality of health care information have been estab-
lished in the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) [2] which came into effect in
April 2003. Medical records are said to be de-identified
when the risk is "very small" that the information can be
used alone or in combination with other reasonably avail-
able information to re-identify individuals associated
with the records. This risk can be estimated and docu-
mented statistically for all the medical records in ques-
tion, or the safe harbor approach can be taken to show
that every record is free of the 18 specific categories of pro-
tected health information (PHI) defined by HIPAA, as
detailed in Table 1.
Performance measures for de-identification algorithms
The performance of de-identification algorithms is gener-
ally expressed in terms of recall, precision and fall-out.
Recall is the proportion of PHI identified by the software
(true positives) out of all instances of PHI in the text (true
positives plus false negatives). Precision is the proportion
of true positives among all terms identified as PHI by the
software (true positives plus false positives). Fallout is the
proportion of non-PHI terms mistakenly reported as PHI
(false positives) out of all non-PHI terms (true negatives
plus false positives). Each word is counted as a separate
term for this evaluation. The terms recall, precision, and
fallout are synonymous with sensitivity, positive predictivity,
and false positive rate as these terms are defined in the con-
text of other detection problems.
Related work
There are relatively few published reports concerning the
de-identification of unstructured medical free text, and
specific algorithms are not usually made publicly availa-
ble. Gupta et al. [5] devised a de-identification engine for
pathology reports that uses a complex combination of dic-
tionaries and text-analysis algorithms. Their approach
locates useful (non-PHI) phrases and replaces the rest of
the text with de-identified tags. For the identification of
relevant medical phrases, the algorithm uses the Unified
Medical Language System (UMLS) meta-thesaurus [24], a
National Institutes of Health (NIH)-sponsored collection
of medical vocabularies, some of which are considered
standard for particular applications.
Sweeney [6] developed the Scrub system, which employs
templates and specialized knowledge of the context to
replace PHI in medical records. The system attempts to
identify PHI using "common-sense" templates and look-
up tables of examplary PHI. Sweeney's system also uses
probability tables for template matching, detectors for
medical terms to reduce false positives, tools to identify
words that sound like other words (to account for spelling
variations), and detectors for recurring terms. Sweeney's
Scrub system identified 99–100% of the PHI in its
author's test set. The false positive rate and details of
Sweeny's test corpus are not available.
Sweeney later developed the Datafly system [7], which
uses user-specific profiles, including a list of preferred
fields to be scrubbed, and what external information
libraries are permitted. The Datafly system is licensed to
Privacert, Inc. [11] and specifics are therefore not publicly
available.
Ruch et al. [12] developed a technique that uses sophisti-
cated natural language techniques to tag words with
appropriate parts of speech and a specialized semantic cat-
egory known as MEDTAG. The technique then uses con-
textual rules based on the tags assigned to the text, using
up to five-word groups and some "long-distance" (non-
local) rules implemented as finite state machines. The
algorithm then attempts to identify PHI in a limited
region around words marked as 'Identity Markers'. The
technique was developed for post-operative reports, labo-
ratory and test results, and discharge summaries, written
primarily in French, though with some documents in Ger-BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2008, 8:32 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/8/32
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man and English. The system found 98–99% of all per-
sonally-identifying information in their test corpus.
Taira et al. [13] created an algorithm to identify patient
name references from clinician correspondence, discharge
summaries, clinical notes, and operative/surgical reports
from pediatric urology records. Their algorithm uses a lex-
icon with over 64,000 first and last names and a set of
semantic constraints to assign probabilities of a given
word being a name. After scanning each sentence and clas-
sifying it according to the type of logical relation it con-
tains, the algorithm then extracts the potential name
based on that logical relation. This technique was shown
to have a recall of 99.2%, but it is limited only to patient
names and is not applicable to other categories of PHI.
Thomas et al. [14] developed a method that uses a lexicon
of 1.8 million proper names to identify potential names
and a list of "Clinical and Common Usage" words from
the UMLS. The Ispell spell-checker dictionary [25] was also
employed to reduce false positives. If a word is on both
lists, a few simple context rules are used to classify the
word. This method was tested on pathology reports and
identified 98.7% of all names in their test corpus.
Berman [15] developed a technique for removing most
PHI from pathology reports by excluding all terms that do
not appear in the UMLS. Berman's algorithm parses sen-
tences into coded concepts from the UMLS and stop-
words, which are high-frequency structural components
of sentences, such as prepositions and common adjec-
tives. All other words, including names and other person-
ally identifiable information, are replaced by blocking
symbols, so that the output is totally stripped of non-med-
ical and extraneous information. As Berman points out,
the limitation with the concept-match scrubber is that it
blocks too much, so the output is full of asterisks (the
blocking symbol) and the text is hard to read'. Since pub-
lishing the concept-match scrubber, Berman has pub-
lished a new scrubber algorithm based upon doublet
(word pair) matching [26]. Berman's new approach parses
through a text, matching every possible doublet (word-
pair) in the text against the list of a list of approved iden-
tifier-free doublets (about 200,000). The doublet scrubber
preserves, in situ, those text doublets that match against
one of the doublets in the "safe" list. Everything else in the
text is blocked (with an asterisk). This produces an output
that is much more readable than the concept-match out-
put and which is also fully de-identified. Although a sig-
nificant improvement, much useful text is still blocked.
A de-identification system similar to ours is the one devel-
oped by Beckwith [16] was tested on a pathology report
corpus containing 3,499 PHI identifiers and was found to
remove all identifying words in pathology reports with a
sensitivity of 98.3%. The 19 HIPAA-specified identifiers
that were missed by Beckwith's system were mainly con-
sult accession numbers and misspelled names. Unfortu-
nately, the system does not perform as well on nursing
progress notes and discharge summaries.
Miller et al. [17] developed a de-identification system for
scrubbing proper names in a free-text database of indexed
surgical pathology reports at the Johns Hopkins Hospital.
Proper names were identified from available lists of per-
sons, places and institutions, or by their proximity to key-
words, such as "Dr." or "hospital." The identified proper
names were subsequently replaced by suitable tokens.
Sweeney [18] examined four de-identification algorithms:
the Scrub system which locates PHI in letters and notes,
the Datafly II system which generalizes and suppresses
values in field-structured data sets, Statistics Netherlands' μ-
Argus system, and the k-similar algorithm. The Scrub sys-
tem comprises a system of parallel detectors, each detector
recognizing a specific type of explicit identifier in a field-
structured database. The Scrub system accurately located
98–100% of all explicit identifiers, but the removal of
only explicit identifiers did not ensure anonymity. The
Datafly II system de-identifies entity-specific data in field-
structured databases. The final outputs of the Datafly II
system are anonymous, yet medically useful. In the μ-
Argus system the data provider assigns to each attribute
the amount of protection necessary. The μ-Argus system
does not ensure an anonymous database, but results in a
lower frequency of removal of useful information than
the Datafly II system. The k-similar algorithm divides the
text into groups of words so that each group consists of k
or more of the most similar tuples (a finite ordered list of
words). The similarity of tuples is based on a minimal dis-
tance measure derived from anonymity and quality met-
rics. Sweeney concluded that the Datafly-II system can
remove too many useful phrases, the Scrub and μ-Argus
systems can fail to provide adequate protection, and that
the k-similar system provides a good trade-off between
these two systems, providing "sufficient" anonymization
and "minimal" loss of useful medical information. (It
should be noted, however, that there is no generally
accepted definition of 'sufficient' and 'minimal' for this
application.)
Sibanda et al. [19] developed a semantic category recogni-
tion approach for document understanding that analyzes
the syntax of documents. More specifically, a statistical
semantic category recognizer is trained with syntactic and
lexical contextual clues and ontological information from
the UMLS. The semantic category recognizer identifies
eight semantic categories in medical discharge summa-
ries, e.g., test results and findings. The results confirm that
syntax is important in semantic category recognition, andBMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2008, 8:32 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/8/32
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Sibanda et al. reported PHI classification recall and preci-
sion measures of above 90% using their test corpus.
Sibanda also developed a software package for de-identi-
fying medical discharge summaries involving statistical
models that employs local lexical and syntactic context
[20]. Each word in a sentence was considered in isolation,
and a Support Vector Machine with a linear kernel, trained
on human-annotated data, was used to determine if a
given word was PHI. The de-identification software iden-
tified at least 92.8% of PHI and misclassified at most 1.1%
of non-PHI in four test corpora.
A very recent development has been a competition run at
the first Workshop on Challenges in Natural Language
Processing for Clinical Data to de-identify discharge sum-
mary free-text data [27]. Excellent performance was
achieved through combining heuristics and statistical
methods by György et al. [28] and Wellner et al. [29], with
recall and precision performance in the range of 96%–
98% and 98%–99% respectively. Their algorithms require
large labelled training and test sets, however. Further-
more, their systems were trained on relatively well-struc-
tured data, such as discharge summaries and it is unclear
how their approaches would perform on nursing progress
notes, which are significantly less structured and gram-
matical than the discharge summaries. In contrast, the sys-
tem presented here is evaluated using nursing notes,
which are likely to be more challenging to de-identify.
Evaluation of our system using discharge summaries sim-
ilar to those used in [27-29], as described in this article,
will allow a more meaningful comparison between our
approach and others, especially if a common corpus can
be used to evaluate multiple algorithms.
Overview of this article
The following sections of this article set forth the design of
an automated de-identification program, methods of test-
ing the software, and evaluation and discussion of its per-
formance.
Methods
Overview of the de-Identification approach
The pattern-matching de-identification approach
described in this article is generally applicable to any free-
text medical records. The algorithm uses the Perl language
to perform lexical matching with look-up tables, regular
expressions, and simple heuristics that perform context
checks to identify and remove PHI.
The current approach de-identifies names (of patients, cli-
nicians, visitors, and proxies), locations (including hospi-
tal names, building names within hospitals, town/city
names, street addresses, zip codes, and PO Box numbers),
dates (partial/full dates and years), telephone/pager/fax
numbers, patient and doctor identification numbers
(including social security numbers, medical record num-
bers, unique patient numbers, unique doctor identifica-
tion numbers), email addresses, URLs, and any mention
of age information for patients over 89 years of age. Addi-
tionally, the algorithm implements filters to remove refer-
ences to ethnicity, and common holidays (such as
Thanksgiving, Christmas, Ramadan, Hanukkah, etc.) that
can be used to infer the date of events or the cultural and
ethnic background of the patients. It should be noted that
ethnicities, common holidays, clinical provider identifiers
(such as names or pager numbers) and year-only dates,
are not defined as PHI by HIPAA.
Though the current version of the algorithm is tuned to
patterns observed in nursing notes and discharge summa-
ries in the MIMIC II database, the approach is general and
may be customized to work on other free-text medical
records. The system provides a modularized design and a
configurable interface that allows users to enable/disable
each PHI filter module. Dictionaries can be modified and
replaced without changes to the software.
Dictionaries
The algorithm uses four types of look-up dictionaries:
￿ Known PHI look-up tables for known names of patients
and hospital staff. The MIMIC II database includes full
patient names associated with each medical record, per-
mitting the extraction of (correctly spelled) full or partial
names of patients specific to each record by direct match-
ing. The hospital staff name list includes the names of the
clinicians from the hospital where the data is collected.
￿ Potential PHI look-up tables for generic female and
male first names, last names, last name prefixes, hospital
names, locations and states. Names and locations are clas-
sified as "ambiguous" if they are also found on a list of
standard English words obtained from Atkinson's Spell
Checking Oriented Word Lists [23] or on the list of UMLS
terms [24].
￿ PHI indicator look-up tables contain keywords or
phrases that often precede or follow PHI terms. These PHI
indicators serve as context clues such as titles ("Mr.",
"Dr.", etc.), name indicators (such as "mother", "son",
"proxy", etc.), location indicators (such as "Hospital",
"Town", "Street", etc.), and age indicators (such as "age",
"patient is", etc.).
￿ Non-PHI look-up tables contain dictionaries of "com-
mon words" or UMLS terms that tend to be non-PHI. A
list of common English words is taken from Atkinson's
Spell Checking Oriented Word Lists.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2008, 8:32 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/8/32
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Since the contents of the look-up tables are separated
from the algorithm itself, changing and supplementing
the look-up tables is simple. If the notes are from a new
local area, for example, the contents of the look-up tables
with the names of local places can be changed. See Appen-
dix C (Additional file 1) for a listing of the dictionary files.
For a detailed description on how these dictionary files are
compiled, interested readers are referred to [10].
Algorithm overview
The process of de-identification involves scanning the
medical notes line-by-line, dividing them into individual
words separated by whitespace. The process then identi-
fies occurrences of PHI using dictionary-based look-ups
and regular expressions. PHI instances that involve
numeric patterns, such as street addresses, PO Box num-
bers, dates and telephone/fax numbers, are identified by
regular expressions based on numeric patterns as well as
appearances of contextual keywords, such as "road" for
street address or "pager" for pager number. Appendix B
(Additional file 1) provides several example regular
expressions in the Perl syntax.
De-identification of non-numeric tokens, such as names
and locations, involves both dictionary look-ups and con-
text checks to locate potential PHI. First, the algorithm
performs a lexical match on each word in the text with dic-
tionaries of PHI look-up tables to locate known and
potential PHI, which is then labelled with the associated
dictionary type. Second, the algorithm performs pattern
matching using regular expressions that look for patterns
with various context keywords, known as name or loca-
tion indicators, to find more named entities. Simple heu-
ristics are applied to qualify or disqualify ambiguous
terms as PHI. In the following section on PHI filter mod-
ules for names, examples of such heuristics are given.
The final step of the de-identification process involves
replacing each PHI with a tag to indicate its corresponding
category. Figure 1 illustrates an example of a de-identified
discharge summary, in which PHI instances have been
replaced by corresponding category tags. Note that all
dates are shifted into the future by a patient-specific
amount; see the section below on Dates.
PHI filter modules
Names
Names directly identify patients and providers, and con-
stitute the most risky PHI category. The algorithm uses
both dictionary look-ups and context checks to locate
potential names. The de-identification of names involves
four basic mechanisms. First, the algorithm uses lexical
matching with known PHI look-up tables to identify
patient and clinician names. The MIMIC II database
includes names of patient and clinicians. These names can
therefore be extracted from each record by direct match-
ing. The names in the medical notes could be spelled
incorrectly, however, (e.g., "Willaim") or the patient may
use a nickname (e.g., "Bill"), so the algorithm cannot rely
solely on being provided with the name information.
(Although an open source spell-checker was used in an
early version of the algorithm [25], it was found that this
gave little improvement in the sensitivity, and a large
increase in the number of false positives.) Additionally,
the identification and removal of the names of other peo-
ple mentioned in the notes, including visiting relatives
and the attending clinicians, is required. Thus, additional
mechanisms are necessary to de-identify names.
The second mechanism identifies potential names within
the text by lexical matching of words from the notes with
all names in the lists of names obtained from the U.S.
Census [22]. The names include nick names and abbrevi-
ated names such as Bill, Tom, Joe, Bob, etc. The potential
names are classified as "ambiguous" and "unambiguous"
names based on whether the names are also found on a
list of standard English words obtained from the Spell
Checking Oriented Word Lists [23] or on the list of medi-
cal terms from the UMLS. If a name is labelled "unambig-
uous", every occurrence of it will be removed from the
text. If a name is "ambiguous", simple heuristics are
Example of discharge note after de-identification by the algo- rithm Figure 1




Name:  [**Known patient lastname**], [**Known patient firstname**]       
         [**Unit Number 626**] 
Admission Date:  [**2016-11-07**]      
Discharge Date:  [**2016-11-22**] 
Date of Birth:   [**1972-09-20**]
Sex:  F 
HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS:  Patient is a 44-year-old lady status post living 
related kidney transplant on [**2016-10-19**], who presented at [**Hospital 36**] for 
end-stage renal disease secondary to type 1 diabetes mellitus. 
She presented to [**Hospital1 **] on [**2016-11-07**] with increased drainage from her 
surgical wound and JP, increased abdominal pain, and anuria x4 days.  The patient 
reported constipation for a week.  She denies flatus.  She was complaining of 
nausea and vomiting.  Her abdominal pain had become progressively worse left lower 
quadrant most notable.  There is no radiation to the back or elsewhere.  She denied any 
fevers, chills.  She noted decreased p.o. intake recently. Her drainage from her wound 
incision and JP was notable for yellowish clear urine smelling fluid. 
========================================== BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2008, 8:32 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/8/32
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applied to determine whether or not to remove it. These
heuristics check for specific name patterns, such as a first
name followed by a last name ("<first name> <last
name>"), last name followed by a comma and then a first
name ("<last name>, <first name>"), and full name with
middle name or a middle initial (e.g., "<first name> <mid-
dle name> <last name>" or "<first name> <initial> <last
name>"). For example, if an ambiguous first name is fol-
lowed by an ambiguous last name in the text, then both
words are removed as PHI.
Third, the algorithm performs a context check to identify
additional PHI by examining words immediately preced-
ing or following (1) names already detected in the text
based on dictionary look-up, or (2) words that are PHI
indicators (such as "Mr.", "Dr.", "name is", "daughter",
"son", "husband", "wife", etc.). This mechanism allows
the algorithm to identify additional names that are either
misspelled or do not appear in any of the supplied name
dictionaries.
The context check using names already detected in the text
is based on the observed name patterns in the medical
notes. For example, for each first name found in the text,
the algorithm checks the immediately following word and
applies heuristics to determine whether it should be
removed; the following word is removed as a last name if
it is not a recognized common word or UMLS term. Other
identifying words, after which an ambiguous name is
removed, include "Mr.", "Dr.", "wife", "friend", or
"nurse".
Fourth, the de-identification software maintains a list of
name instances found in the medical notes seen so far for
a particular patient. After the algorithm has identified a
list of names as potential PHI after processing a note, the
entire note is re-scanned, and words that match the names
in the PHI list found from this current note and also those
identified from previous notes from the same patient are
removed as PHI. This mechanism is motivated by the
observation that the same names often reappear in the
notes for a single patient. The patient's son may visit
often, or the same clinicians may see the patient during
her stay. While the first instance of a name is usually pre-
ceded by a name indicator, and thus can be de-identified
by the third mechanism described above, subsequent
mentioning of the same name may not be preceded by
any apparent context keywords.
Names are currently replaced with a [**Name**] tag. If
the software is able to determine the name types (first,
last, or initial) based on dictionary look-ups and the name
patterns (e.g., "last name, first name"), then the identified
name PHI is replaced with name type tags accordingly,
indicating whether the PHI is a full name, a female/male
first name, a last name, and/or a name initial.
Dates
Medical discharge summaries and nursing notes tend to
be rich in dates. The HIPAA regulations stipulate that all
day/month combinations pertaining to patients, (e.g.,
birth, admission, discharge dates, etc.) be scrubbed during
de-identification. Since it is difficult for automated soft-
ware to determine whether a date pertains to a patient, all
dates identified in the text are removed and replaced by a
patient-specific offset. Dates generally follow specific for-
mats, and the software attempts to match any of these for-
mats in the text. Contextual information is also
considered before identifying a portion of the text as date
PHI.
Years are not considered PHI according to HIPAA regula-
tions. However, years when taken in combination with
other medical information may reveal when the patient
experienced a landmark medical event. For example, the
mention of "CABG 1996" in a nursing note divulges that
the patient underwent a Coronary Artery Bypass Graft in
1996. This information may be used to substantially nar-
row down the set of patients to whom the medical record
in question may pertain, thus increasing the risk of patient
identification. All instances of years are replaced, in addi-
tion to the HIPAA-specified date formats, to maintain
stringent de-identification standards.
The de-identification process replaces all PHI found with
a PHI category tag. Dates, however, are necessary to track
the patient's stay at the hospital and the evolution of his/
her medical condition. For example, it is important for a
medical researcher to know the interval in days between
two events in the record, or the duration of the patient's
stay in the hospital. The software therefore automatically
re-identifies dates with a shifted date which preserves the
day of the week and season to prevent inconsistencies
with season-specific descriptions in the text and to prevent
temporal errors or confusion due to relative temporal
phrasing, e.g., "last winter" or "next Tuesday". Each date is
shifted by a patient-specific random number of days that
is consistent for the patient throughout all his or her de-
identified medical files. The original date format in the
text is preserved as much as possible in the re-identified
text, e.g., month/year is replaced by a shifted month/year
whereas an individual year is replaced by a shifted indi-
vidual year. Dates of birth are treated in the same manner,
preserving a patient's age.
Locations
HIPAA defines geographically precise location identifiers,
which indicate a location smaller than a state, as PHI (see
Table 1). Since the MIMIC II database contains patientBMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2008, 8:32 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/8/32
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information from local hospitals, neighboring locations
are more likely than other geographic locations to appear
as PHI. A list of neighboring locations was therefore com-
piled, and each word and phrase in the text is matched
against this list to identify possible location PHI. Identi-
fied locations are replaced by [**Location**] tags.
Telephone, fax, social security, and other identification numbers
Patient and provider identities can be easily tracked down
from telephone numbers, fax numbers, Social Security
Numbers (SSN), medical identification numbers and
medical record numbers. In fact, the level of risk associ-
ated with released SSNs can be as high as the risk associ-
ated with released full names.
However, patient-specific alpha-numeric identifiers can
often resemble medical data. The de-identification soft-
ware therefore checks the text for specific numerical for-
mats, making sure to exclude medical data that may have
similar formats, e.g., heart rates, blood pressures and
blood gas data. For example, numeric patterns such as
XXX-XXXX are generally identified as telephone numbers
except when preceded by medical terms such as "SVR",
"VT", "Tidal Volume" etc. The dictionary of these terms
was compiled from repeated searches through the MIMIC
II database for abbreviations.
Ages over 89
Hospital patient populations generally include few sub-
jects over the age of 89 and therefore the HIPAA regula-
tions require lumping of all ages over 89 into a single
category. The de-identification software searches for either
numerical or text patterns that fall within an age range of
90–125. For example, it will identify an age expressed
either as '95', 'ninety-five' or 'ninety five'. The upper limit
of the age range is introduced as a sanity check since it is
highly unlikely that a patient's age will exceed 125. Addi-
tionally the software examines the textual context to deter-
mine if candidate text actually enumerates an age. Only
numbers between 90 and 125 inclusively, that are either
preceded or followed by words such as "age", "patient is",
"years old", "yo", etc., are identified as PHI. The identified
age is then replaced by a general [**Age over 89 **] tag
that aggregates all ages over 89 into a single group to pre-
serve confidentiality, but that still presents the age infor-
mation to enable a medical understanding of the patient's
condition.
Miscellaneous PHI categories
Not only must patient information be removed from the
MIMIC II text files, but also information specific to the
hospitals and its providers. Hospital-specific information
can narrow down the subset of patients to whom a record
may pertain. For example, the subset of 49-year-old
patients in Ward A of Hospital X is significantly smaller
than that of 49-year-old patients anywhere in a given
state. To this end the following additional PHI categories
have been added: provider names, hospital names, ward
names, and any other HIPAA categories specific to hospi-
tals and providers. The software de-identifies these catego-
ries using lists of known PHI, pattern-matching rules and
context information.
The software searches for a wide range of miscellaneous
PHI types that are not included in the gold standard cor-
pus, which are listed in Appendix A (Additional file 1). In
particular, subroutines exist which look for email and IP/
URL addresses (using contextual clues such as "@",
"http", "http", "://", "www.", "web.", ".org", ".com" and
".net").
Data sets
The MIMIC II database is an annotated database of phys-
iologic waveforms and related signals and accompanying
clinical data from intensive care unit (ICU) patients. The
database includes physiologic signals, free-text medical
records, laboratory test reports, etc., for over 17,000
patients [1]. Approval for the collection and use of the
data in this study was obtained from the appropriate insti-
tutional review board (IRB).
To evaluate the de-identification approach described in
this article, a randomly selected subset of the nursing
progress notes was extracted from the MIMIC II database.
The nursing progress notes are unstructured free text typed
into a clinical information system by the nurses at the end
of each shift. The notes include observations about the
patient's medical history, his/her current physical and
psychological state, medications being administered, lab-
oratory test results, and other information about the
patient's course in the ICU.
Nursing notes appear to be significantly more challenging
to de-identify than other forms of medical notes, such as
discharge summaries and radiology reports. In nursing
progress notes, the clinical staff frequently employs tech-
nical terminology, non-standard abbreviations, ungram-
matical statements, misspellings, and incorrect
punctuation and capitalization.
The de-identification approach described in this article
was evaluated using two different corpora of nursing
notes. The first corpus, consisting of 2,434 nursing notes,
was fully de-identified and then re-identified with surro-
gate PHI by multiple experts to provide a gold standard
for the de-identification software [3,4]. This gold standard
corpus was used to fine-tune the software during its itera-
tive development process. In order to test the software on
data not used for development, a second set of 1,836 nurs-
ing notes, known as the test corpus, was prepared. PHIBMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2008, 8:32 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/8/32
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missed by the software was identified by human annota-
tors to obtain an estimate of the recall performance of the
approach detailed here. In the following sections, the gold
standard corpus and the test corpus are described in more
detail.
Development of the gold standard corpus
A corpus of nursing notes was thoroughly de-identified
manually and then re-identified with surrogate PHI (sim-
ilar in nature to each PHI type removed) to create a gold
standard for developing and testing de-identification soft-
ware [3,4,10]. The names in the corpus were replaced with
names adapted from publicly available lists of names with
randomly swapped first and last names. Locations were
replaced from randomly selected small towns in a differ-
ent part of the country. For details of the re-identification
process, interested readers are referred to Douglass et al.
[4,10].
The gold standard corpus consists of nursing notes from
the medical records of 163 patients selected randomly
from the MIMIC II database [1]. All the nursing notes
associated with these 163 patients were used, comprising
2,434 notes, with approximately 334,000 words. Of those
notes, 99 were selected at random for manual "enrich-
ment" to include text that is especially difficult to de-iden-
tify (such as "Wilson's disease" and "Parkinson's tremor")
and to include more instances of PHI.
Three clinicians from local hospitals independently per-
formed a manual review of the notes, labelling and classi-
fying all PHI. A highly sensitive prototype de-
identification algorithm was then used to locate any fur-
ther PHI that the clinicians may have missed. A fourth cli-
nician then reviewed all the results and adjudicated all
disagreements. Each PHI was also re-identified by the
same adjudicator using lists of suggested replacements
drawn from type-specific dictionaries. The resulting gold
standard corpus includes a list of all PHI in the original
corpus, and is considered to have an almost perfect recall
of 1.0 and precision of 1.0. Table 2 details the perform-
ance of a single clinician, the union of two clinicians, and
the union of three clinicians de-identifying the corpus,
with respect to the gold standard corpus. The results of de-
identification varied from clinician to clinician, with
recall ranging from 0.63 to 0.94. (Definitions of recall and
precision are given in the Performance Measures section.)
The gold standard corpus contains a total of 1,779 PHI
elements. Of these, 211 were introduced manually into
the enriched text. Before enrichment, there were about
120 words per note, 15 notes per patient and about 0.64
pieces of PHI per note.
Table 3 provides the frequency and distribution of each
category of PHI in the original gold standard corpus
(before enrichment), the number of enriching PHI added
in each category, and the total PHI count and distribution
in the resulting gold standard corpus (with enrichment).
The PHI in the gold standard corpus fall into the follow-
ing categories: name, date, location, phone number, age
over 89, and other. The name category is further divided
into the following sub-categories: patient names, patient
name initials, relative/proxy names, and clinician names.
The date category is divided into dates with day, month
and/or year, and dates with reference to year only. The
phone numbers include telephone numbers, cell phone
numbers, and fax/pager/beeper numbers. The locations
include hospital names and city/town names. Three
instances of PHI found in the corpus were classified as
"undefined", and are alpha-numeric patterns and num-
bers found in the notes that have un-identified type/
meaning or are ambiguous in terms of whether they
should be considered PHI. For example, one of them is a
hospital policy number with an alphanumeric pattern
that could potentially be used to infer the identity of the
hospital.
Note that the 1,779 PHI instances in the gold standard
corpus include both critical and non-critical PHI catego-
ries. (Critical PHI are personal health information as
defined by HIPAA [2]. Non-critical PHI, such as clinician
names, name initials, and years, not defined as PHI by
HIPAA.) Of the 1,779 PHI, about 36% are non-critical
PHI. While names in general account for more than 45%
of the overall PHI, approximately two thirds of the names
in the corpus are clinician names.
The gold standard corpus provided the basis for contex-
tual evaluation and improvement of the de-identification
software during its iterative development process. The re-
identified gold standard corpus with its associated surro-
gate PHI information is available via PhysioNet [8,9]
under a limited data use agreement. (The data use agree-
ment requires the user to certify that they will not attempt
to re-identify any of the individuals in the corpus, or dis-
tribute the data to anyone else.) Appendix A (Additional
file 1) lists the PHI tags the software can generate.
Table 2: Clinician de-identification performance.
Min Max Mean
1 person Recall 0.63 0.94 0.81
Precision 0.95 1.00 0.98
2 people Recall 0.89 0.98 0.94
Precision 0.95 0.99 0.97
3 people Recall 0.98 0.99 0.98
Precision 0.95 0.99 0.97BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2008, 8:32 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/8/32
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Test corpus
In order to test the algorithm on data not used in the
development of the algorithm, a second set of nursing
notes was selected. This "test" corpus consists of 1,836
nursing notes (and a total 296,400 words) randomly
drawn from a subset of 123 patients in the MIMIC II data-
base. In contrast to the gold standard corpus, the PHI in
these notes is not re-identified and therefore the occur-
rences of PHI appear in their original form. Furthermore,
no attempt was made to identify true positives in this test
data, since the primary goal is to identify the PHI that
escapes the de-identification algorithm. (A true positive
rate can be as low as 80% or 90% without substantially
affecting the readability of the notes [10].) The main con-
cern here is to remove PHI robustly, with the understand-
ing that the loss of some useful data is inevitable. An
empirical assessment of the 'usefulness' of the data is
application dependent and outside the scope of this arti-
cle.
Therefore, instead of obtaining a full PHI count on the
notes, human annotators were asked to identify only
missed PHI, to allow us to estimate the false negative rate
(which indicates the algorithm's recall). An early proto-
type of the de-identification software described here [4]
was applied to the test data to generate a preliminary set
of scrubbed nursing notes. Each of 14 reviewers was then
assigned approximately 130 of these scrubbed nursing
notes and was charged to identify any PHI remaining in
the scrubbed text. (A financial incentive was offered to the
reviewer who found the largest number of false nega-
tives.) Reviewers labelled each of the missed PHI with the
appropriate PHI category. The results of the findings are
presented in the in the following results section.
Evaluation criteria
The performance of the algorithm was analyzed on both
the gold standard corpus and the test corpus. However,
these analyses differed because the test corpus was anno-
tated only for false negatives (i.e., missed PHI) and full
human consensus annotations are only available for the
gold standard corpus.
For the evaluation using the gold standard corpus, the
algorithm was supplied with the re-identified first and last
names of all 163 patients, a list of re-identified clinician
names, local town names, and local hospital names, as
well as a list of generic names (from Census data [22]),
popular American names, and generic locations (e.g.,
major U.S. cities). Note that no name dictionary is usually
available for names of visiting relatives or proxies. As a
result, the algorithm relies entirely on pattern matching
using a list of generic names to de-identify names of rela-
tives and proxies.
Since false positives are not available in the test corpus,
only the number of false negatives per PHI category is
reported, and the PHI frequency distribution observed in
the gold standard corpus is used to compute an estimated
recall value for the test data.
Results
Performance on re-identified gold standard corpus
In this section, the algorithm's performance is examined
on the public version of the gold standard corpus, which
was used for the iterative development of the algorithm
described in this article. The filtering performance for each
different type of PHI is reported.
The de-identification output was evaluated using all 1,779
PHIs in the gold standard. The overall recall, precision,
and fallout of the algorithm are 0.967, 0.749, and 0.002
respectively. The PHI types were also divided into 'critical'
and 'non-critical' PHI. Critical PHI was defined as all PHI
types listed by HIPAA, and 'non-critical' PHI as the
remaining categories that were included to make mali-
cious re-identification even more difficult. Excluding non-
critical PHI from the evaluation does not change the algo-
Table 3: PHI category breakdown in gold standard corpus.
PHI Type Original Count/Distribution Added PHI (Enrichment) Total Count/Distribution After Enrichment
Patient Name 34 (2.17%) 20 54 (3.04%)
Patient Name Initial 2 (0.13%) 0 2 (0.11%)
Relative/Proxy Name 125 (7.97%) 50 175 (9.84%)
Clinician Name 518 (33.04%) 75 593 (33.33%)
Date (not year) 475 (30.29%) 6 482 (27.09%)
Year 42 (2.68%) 4 46 (2.59%)
Location 328 (20.92%) 40 367 (20.63%)
Phone 37 (2.36%) 16 53 (2.98%)
Age over 89 4 (0.26%) 0 4 (0.22%)
Undefined 3 (0.19%) 0 3 (0.17%)
Total 1,568 211 1,779BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2008, 8:32 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/8/32
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rithm's recall significantly; the recall of the algorithm on
critical PHI in the gold standard corpus is 0.961.
Table 4 lists the number of PHIs, false negative count,
recall, and precision of the de-identification algorithm in
each category. The per-category recall for category i is
defined as the number of true positives in category i iden-
tified by the software divided by the number of PHIs in
that category. The per-category precision for category i is
defined as the number of true positives in category i
divided by all PHIs located by the algorithm using the fil-
ter specific to category i. No per-category precision is
reported for PHI in the "Undefined" category, since these
PHIs are extremely infrequent or absent from the gold
standard corpus. Note that, in some cases, a word may be
declared as PHI by multiple filter types in the algorithm.
For example, the word "Calvert" in Calvert Hospital may
be de-identified by both the name and location filters.
Thus, for the per-category precision, the list of terms used
to generate the denominator in the metric are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive across categories.
The algorithm is able to de-identify all references to the
first and last names of the patients that appeared in the
gold standard corpus. The algorithm has a recall at or
above 0.95 in most of the critical PHI categories, includ-
ing patient names, visiting relative names, dates (not
year), locations, and phone numbers. The only exception
is the 'age over 89' category, where only four PHI instances
in that category are available for evaluation. The algo-
rithm does not perform as well in name initials and years,
which are not PHI according to HIPAA regulations, and
are classed as non-critical PHI.
Although the precision of the software (0.75) is relatively
low in comparison to manual de-identification (average
precision 0.98 from one human de-identifier), it should
be noted that the readability and information content of
the de-identified notes are not significantly compromised.
Of the false positives that were generated, about 38% are
numeric patterns, most of which are physiological meas-
urements that are available elsewhere in the MIMIC II
database as either low- or high-resolution trend or wave-
form data. Many of these text based false positives are
from random, misspelled words (e.g., "has" misspelled as
"hass" will be de-identified as a name). Observations
based on the de-identified medical notes generated from
the software suggest that such misspelled words, when
removed from the notes as false positives, usually have lit-
tle impact on the readability of the notes, as they usually
do not convey critical information about the patients.
Words that appear as false positives at high frequency are
usually common words or medical terms that are also
potential names, such as "MAE" (acronym for "moving all
extremities") and "will". The top 5 most frequent non-
numeric false positive terms (and their frequencies of
occurrence in parenthesis) are: MAE (10), AND (6), WILL
Table 4: Performance on gold standard corpus.
PHI Type PHI sub-type Count # FNs # FNs per 100,000 words Per Category Recall Per Category Precision
Name Patient Name 54 0 0 1.00
Patient Name Initial 2 2 0.598 0.00
Relative/Proxy Name 175 4 1.195 0.977
Clinician Name 593 3 1.494 0.995 0.725
Date Date (not year) 482 26 7.769 0.946
Year 46 11 3.287 0.761 0.713
Location 367 10 4.482 0.973 0.922
Phone 53 0 0 1.00 0.898
Age over 89 4 1 0.299 0.750 0.600
Undefined 3 2 0.598 0.333 N/A
Overall 1779 59 19.720 0.967 0.749
(FNs are false negatives and N/A indicates not applicable)BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2008, 8:32 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/8/32
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(5), LOS (4), and ADA (3). (LOS means "Length of Stay",
ADA means "American Diabetes Association".) Medical
terms and common words that appear in the UMLS and
common word dictionaries are not removed as PHI unless
they are potential names and are preceded or followed by
name indicators (such as "daughter" or "friend") or
another word that is also a potential name. For example,
while "MAE" in general is left intact in the notes, "PERL,
MAE" (pupils equal, reactive to light, moves all extremi-
ties) will be labelled as PHI (and replaced by a tag) since
"PERL" is a potential name.
Performance on test corpus
In this section, the performance of the software on the test
corpus is detailed. The PHI elements in these notes were
not re-identified and appeared in their original form.
Instead, the false negative count was calculated, since
minimizing the number of missed PHI is crucial in pro-
tecting patient confidentiality. The manual evaluators cat-
egorized the false negatives into their corresponding PHI
categories. The results are summarized in Table 5.
None of the full or last names that escaped the de-identi-
fication software were associated with patients. Further-
more, at the time of the evaluation, the software did not
use the patient and provider names available in the
MIMIC II database.
The software performs well at identifying HIPAA PHI
types such as full names, full dates and ages over 89. Only
one full date was missed, which although can present a
potential problem, may not be critical if other associated
dates are time-shifted. General locations (not street
addresses), partial dates and years pose limited risk, and
are recognized as PHI with reasonable effectiveness. Based
on the frequency of PHI instances observed in the gold
standard corpus (before PHI enrichment), an estimated
474 instances of PHI per 100,000 words should exist in
the test corpus. This yields an estimated recall of 0.943 for
the algorithm's performance on test data, where a total of
27 false negatives were observed per 100,000 words, or
0.55 false negatives per patient (see Table 5). However,
over half these instances of missed PHI are part of the
extended (non-HIPAA) PHI categories.
Performance without customized dictionaries
One question that relates to the generality of the approach
described in this article is how much the algorithm's
power in de-identifying names and locations relies on dic-
tionary-based look-up with known PHI, versus pattern
matching using PHI indicators and look-ups using generic
dictionaries. While using customized name and location
dictionaries of known PHI types ensures the removal of
those PHI occurrences from the medical text, this
approach also makes the algorithm's performance
dependent on the quality and completeness of the dic-
tionaries supplied by the users.
In this section, the performance of the algorithm is tested
by running the de-identification algorithm on the gold
standard corpus without any customized dictionary of
patient names, clinician names, local town names, and
hospital names. The algorithm, however, is supplied with
a dictionary of generic names and locations (e.g., major
cities in the U.S.).
The results show that, as expected, the performance of the
algorithm is lower without the customized dictionaries.
The overall recall and precision of the algorithm drop to
0.834 and 0.725 respectively, although there is no signifi-
cant change to the fallout value, which remained in the
0.002 range. The false negative count and recall for each
PHI category are summarized in Table 6.
It should be noted that the de-identification algorithm
performs very well in all names even without dictionaries
of specific patient and clinician names; the recalls for all
name categories remain above 0.95, suggesting that pat-
tern matching and look-up on generic name dictionaries
reap the majority of the performance benefits in these cat-
egories. This is due to the fact that there is a relatively con-
sistent pattern to most of the names in the corpus.
Table 5: Categorization of algorithm false negatives by PHI type on test corpus.
PHI Type # False negatives in 296,400 words/1,836 nursing notes # False negatives per 100,000 words Recall
Full name 4 † 1
Last name 14 † 5
First name 31 † 11
Location (not street address) 7 2
Full date 2 1 Unknown
Partial date 9 3
Year 8 3
Age over 89 3 1
Overall 78 27 0.94 (estimated)
† None of these names were actually patient names, and therefore were non-critical PHI.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2008, 8:32 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/8/32
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Patients' and doctors' names are mostly preceded by titles
such as Mr., Ms., and Dr. Most of the relative/proxy names
are preceded by keywords, such as "daughter", "son",
"husband", or "proxy", etc., when they appear for the first
time in the corpus. In addition to performing lexical
matching with the dictionary (when one is provided), the
algorithm uses the titles and keywords as well as a list of
generic names for de-identification.
In contrast, the location detection subroutine performs
significantly worse without the local town and hospital
names dictionaries; the recall in the location category
drops from 0.97 to 0.37. This is partly due to the fact that
it is more difficult to construct consistent patterns to de-
identify locations. For example, while the algorithm
checks for hospital name patterns using keywords such as
"hospital", "medical center", and "clinic", many hospital
names are in the form of acronyms (e.g., GH instead of
General Hospital) and thus it is sometimes difficult to
identify this type of (non-critical) PHI.
Discussion
The de-identification software was developed to scrub
patient and provider identifying information from
MIMIC II free-text medical records before limited public
release of the data under a data use agreement. This soft-
ware has been used to de-identify approximately 700,000
nursing notes, 30,000 discharge summaries, and 300,000
radiology reports, containing a total of approximately 220
million words (~1.8 GB). Our algorithm, running on a
standard desk-top computer (3.4 GHz Pentium 4 proces-
sor with 512 kb cache) can de-identify text at a rate of
approximately 10 MB per hour. Large US hospitals pro-
duce terabytes of data annually, but typically only about 8
GB of this is free text data (22 MB/day) [30], so that real
time de-identification of free text data from a major hos-
pital seems quite feasible with our software. De-identifica-
tion of large volumes of data can be even more rapidly
performed using several multi-core servers, as is our cur-
rent approach.
The algorithm recall performance on the gold standard
corpus of re-identified nursing notes (with an average rate
of 0.967) is better than the average individual human de-
identifier (0.81), the best single human de-identifier
(0.94), and the average consensus of two human de-iden-
tifiers (0.94). On the test data, the algorithm performs as
well as the best single human de-identifier and the average
consensus of two human de-identifiers.
The algorithm performed well with critical PHI, missing
no patient names in each corpus. Only one instance of an
age over 89 was missed in the gold standard data, and
three in the test corpus. This indicates that number-related
sub-routines performed well, evidenced by the fact that
only two full dates were missed in the test corpus.
Locations proved more difficult to detect, with less than
five and two false negatives per 100,000 words in the gold
standard and test corpora respectively. It is interesting to
note that when customized dictionaries are not used, the
algorithm performs almost as well, except for locations,
with more than 23 times as many incidences of PHI for
this category. It is therefore important to make sure that
an extensive local dictionary is used to ensure locations
smaller than a state, and in particular hospital-specific
names, are removed by the algorithm.
Word misspellings are a major source of difficulty in de-
identifying free text. Extensive lists of known PHI are used
to identify instances of names, locations, etc. No spell-
checking libraries such as Ispell or Aspell [25] are used.
However, misspelled PHI instances do not match these
known PHI instances, and currently context information
is used to identify them. For example, uncommon words
preceded by "Mr." or "Doctor" are identified as name PHI.
Table 6: Performance without customized dictionary on gold standard corpus.
PHI Type PHI sub-type Count # FNs Per Category Recall Per Category Precision
Name Patient Name 54 1 0.981
Patient Name Initial 2 2 0.00
Relative/Proxy Name 175 5 0.971
Clinician Name 593 24 0.973 0.731
Date Date (not year) 482 26 0.946
Year 46 11 0.761 0.712
Location 367 231 0.371 0.840
Phone 53 0 1.00 0.898
Age over 89 4 1 0.750 0.600
Undefined 3 2 0.333 N/A
Overall 1779 295 0.834 0.725
(FNs are false negatives and N/A indicates not applicable.)BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2008, 8:32 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/8/32
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The false positive count rises when these context rules are
too inclusive, while lax rules elevate the risk of PHI
release. The rules for the algorithm were based on careful
evaluation of the trade-off between the number of false
negatives and false positives.
An obvious extension is to look for likely misspellings of
the patient's name if known a priori as names are the most
dangerous type of PHI to miss. Similarly, searches for sin-
gle digit omissions, insertions and reversals in social secu-
rity numbers, medical record numbers and other a priori
known patient identifiers can be used.
In addition to the PHI categories specified by HIPAA, free-
text context information may reveal a patient's identity.
For example, "the patient's trailer was blown away by a
tornado the night before Christmas" is a piece of text that
does not contain any terms that are outright PHI, but the
date is obvious to a human and a news search could
potentially reveal details on this newsworthy event and
the identity of this relatively unique patient. Despite the
risk of such inadvertent PHI disclosure, it is not feasible to
have a clinician review every de-identified record to
ensure removal of all PHI. In fact, Table 2 illustrates that
even a consensus of three expert de-identifiers was incapa-
ble of removing all PHI. A potential, but difficult avenue
for further work would be to devise an intelligent method
to scrub contextual information, such as in the above
example, which can indirectly reveal a patient's identity.
Although machine learning approaches coupled with
large and representative labelled databases could identify
some PHI occurrences, such systems are innately fragile.
The combination of machine learning techniques with
sensible heuristics has been shown to improve the preci-
sion and recall of de-identification systems [28]. How-
ever, it is unlikely that all eventualities can be represented
in either of these approaches. It is more likely that an
information-identification approach will work more
accurately and ultimately be of more use. That is, there is
an assumption that every component of a medical text is
intended to mean something to the person who wrote it.
A classification problem that identifies the semantic cate-
gories of each component of the text can thus mark for
exclusion as potential PHI (or irrelevant information) any
element for which it has no contrary evidence.
Before such systems can be developed, gold standard cor-
pora (encompassing a vast range of data types) must be
created and made available. Until now no public database
of free text elements of medical records has been availa-
ble, and comparisons of the algorithm described here
with other algorithms are therefore difficult. Brief testing
of other publicly available algorithms produced poor
results on the gold standard and test corpora because each
algorithm is designed specifically for a particular type of
data structure. The availability of de-identification algo-
rithms, especially open-source algorithms that can be cus-
tomized and extended, will make further development of
large gold-standard corpora feasible.
Medical de-identification systems have the potential for
widespread use in information sharing for research pur-
poses. The system described here is sufficiently general-
ized to handle text files of almost any format, albeit with
varying performance, and will be useful in other research
groups' de-identification efforts and database construc-
tion. Each PHI identification module can be switched on
or off and dictionaries can be changed or switched. Fur-
thermore, the user is able to specify which word categories
are to be identified as PHI. Thus, it is possible to identify
the full range of PHI categories or any subset of it, making
the software appropriate for use on any type of text or
medical record. In the spirit of open-source software, the
full source-code has been made available online for pub-
lic use via PhysioNet [8,9].
It should be noted however, that de-identification does
not supersede the Common Rule [31], which applies to
any human subject research that draws from any confi-
dential medical records and states the responsibility of
researchers to obtain IRB approval prior to data collec-
tion, as well as the responsibilities of IRB's to ensure the
data are used safely.
IRB's are allowed, in the case of "minimal risk" and signif-
icant benefit, to grant permission to use clinical data in
research without explicit patient consent, if such consent
would be impractical to get. For example, we received
approval to use raw patient data to help develop de-iden-
tification algorithms, with various safeguards to make
sure that the data do not "leak". Our algorithm, however,
is not meant to subvert these rules, and as such, our algo-
rithm is insufficient to remove all PHI types required by
HIPAA, and human oversight is also probably required.
An alternative approach that virtually ensures full HIPAA-
compliant de-identification is that of concept-matching
[26] where the output is devoid of phrases that do not
map to a reference terminology and is stripped of non-
medical and extraneous information. Although, some rel-
evant information may be removed, concept matching
also provides the terminology code for each medical term
included in the sentence, making it possible to index and
relate the terms to each other and standard biomedical
ontologies.
Conclusion
This article describes a de-identification algorithm that
has a better recall rating than the average de-identificationBMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2008, 8:32 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/8/32
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efforts of a consensus of two trained medical profession-
als, and significantly better recall than any one expert. In
any de-identification system, there is a strong possibility
that the software may encounter PHI that are absent in the
extensive dictionaries of known PHI and that are also not
identified by the rules. To reduce the risk of inadvertent
PHI exposure, the MIMIC II (non-gold standard) de-iden-
tified text files are being released only to selected research
groups who are required to sign data use agreements. As
such, we do not recommend the open publication of after
scrubbing with our algorithm. It should also be noted that
without explicit IRB approval, even with a 'perfectly' accu-
rate algorithm, publication of data may not be allowed.
This is because potentially embarrassing or legally sensi-
tive information (not explicitly prohibited under HIPAA)
may be contained in text.
In the version of the software that has been released to the
public, references to the doctor and patient names
extracted from MIMIC II that are specific to the database
have been excluded. Additionally, the re-identification
module of the software has been excluded from the
released version since this module provides a mapping
between each PHI in the text file and the surrogate term
with which it is replaced. All information essential to the
algorithm's functioning has been included, however,
including dictionaries of common words and certain Sys-
tematized Nomenclature of Medicine (SNOMED) termi-
nology extracted from the UMLS, lists of first and last
names, and other relevant sources.
The current release of the software is optimized for per-
formance on MIMIC II nursing notes and discharge sum-
maries from U.S. hospitals, and the gold standard corpus
currently used to determine performance statistics
includes only nursing notes. With textual medical records
becoming increasingly important for medical research,
de-identification and evaluation of different types of
records is increasingly important. In future work it will be
interesting to evaluate the current de-identification soft-
ware on other medical records, e.g., X-ray, EKG and echo
reports. By posting the source code (under an open source
license) and the annotated data that was used to tune the
algorithm [8], we hope that the algorithm will undergo
further development and adaptation to a wide variety of
free text records. Other groups are also invited to contrib-
ute to the software and databases to increase the variety of
dictionaries and free text corpora available for de-identifi-
cation evaluation.
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